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Interest Rates
Abstract
In this paper we study corporate debt values, capital structure, and the term struc-
ture of interest rates in a uniﬁed framework. We employ numerical techniques to
compute the ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure and the value of its long-term risky debt
and yield spreads when the value of the ﬁrm’s unleveraged assets and the instanta-
neous default-free interest rate are risk factors. Debt and leveraged ﬁrm value are thus
explicitly linked to properties of the ﬁrm’s unleveraged assets, the term structure of
default-free interest rates, taxes, bankruptcy costs, payout rates, and bond covenants.
The results clarify the relationship between a ﬁrm’s capital structure and movements
in the term structure and other important aspects of the capital structure decision.1 Introduction
This paper considers the optimal capital structure of a ﬁrm when the ﬁrm chooses both the
amount and maturity of its debt. The model extends that of Leland and Toft (1996) to the
case where the default-free interest rate follows the square-root diﬀusion of Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1985) and the ﬁrm can choose arbitrary debt structures. The incorporation
of the interest rate as a priced risk factor allows us to study how the shape of the term
structure and the correlation of a ﬁrm’s asset returns with movements in interst rates interact
to determine a ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure. Allowing ﬁrms to choose arbitrary debt
structures enhances the realism of the model and allows us to analyze how ﬁrms adjust their
capital structures in response to changes in the term structure.
Our model is also related to that of Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), who analyze the
valuation of risky ﬁxed and ﬂoating-rate debt in a model with stochastic ﬁrm value and
interest rates.1 While similar, our modeling framework diﬀers signiﬁcantly from theirs: (i)
we explicitly consider ﬁrm payouts; (ii) the interest rate process that we utilize does not
allow negative interest rates and is estimated against Treasury data (producing an estimate
of the price of interest rate risk, which is apparently set to zero in Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995)); and (iii) we do not assume that ﬁrm value is independent of the capital structure
of the ﬁrm. These additional features come at a cost: we must employ numeric techniques
in order to solve our model.
Our key result is that the level of the short rate has a signiﬁcant impact on the optimal
leverage ratio of the ﬁrm. For example, if the short rate is three percent, 20 year debt is
optimal and the optimal leverage ratio (value of debt divided by unleveraged asset value) is
approximately 30 percent. When the short rate rises to 15 percent, 20 year debt is again
optimal and the leverage ratio is 60 percent. The logic for why the leverage ratio rises with
the risk-free rate is analogous to the logic oﬀered by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) for how
1Huang, Ju and Ou-Yang (2003) examine a ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure under the Longstaﬀ and
Schwartz (1995) model.
1the risk-free rate aﬀects credit spreads: in the risk-neutral setting, a higher risk-free rate
means all assets are expected to have higher returns. Hence the unleveraged assets of the
ﬁrm are expected to appreciate at a higher rate and the ﬁrm’s debt capacity increases.
We also ﬁnd that the correlation of a ﬁrm’s asset returns with the risk-free rate potentially
plays an important role in determining the risk spread on its debt. Firm’s with assets that
are negatively correlated with interest rates face lower risk spreads than ﬁrms with assets
that have zero or positive correlation with interest rates. However, optimal leverage ratios
show very little variation across diﬀerent settings of the correlation parameter. In eﬀect, the
ﬁrm is a portfolio of a long position in an asset and a short position in bonds. While the mix
of assets and bonds that maximizes the value of this portfolio does not change, ﬁrms with
positive asset correlations are unable to diversify as well and hence face higher risk spreads.
An implication of this is that the model will do a better job at explaining cross-sectional
variation in risk spreads than capital ratios, though in this version of the paper we do not
test any of the empirical implications of our model.
Higher interest-rate volatility boosts risk spreads, principally at longer maturities. How-
ever, under plausible settings of this parameter, interest rate volatility plays a minor role in
determining the optimal leverage ratio. We also examine how the rate of mean reversion in
interest rates aﬀects optimal leverage. While our interest rate model is estimated against
a long time span of observed data, and these data indicate only weak mean-reversion, we
consider cases where mean reversion is stronger as a way of better understanding the op-
eration of the model, and as a way of gaining insight into a more complicated model that
might allow the rate of mean reversion to change over time. Naturally, we ﬁnd that when
mean reversion is very strong, there is far less sensitivity of the optimal capital structure
to the initial level of the short rate—the optimal capital structure is that prevailing at the
mean interest rate, since ﬁrms expect rates to revert back to the mean rapidly. The price
of interest rate risk is also an important determinant of leverage. A higher price of interest
rate risk is associated with a higher term premium and hence a higher value of the tax shield
2associated with longer-term debt.
Finally, we examine how optimal capital structure varies under the parameters that deﬁne
the process for the ﬁrm’s unleveraged asset value. There is little news here; our results are
in line with previous models that considered capital structure where the ﬁrm’s assets follow
the log-normal diﬀusion that we use here.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our valuation framework and our key
assumptions. Section 3 discusses our comparative statics exercises designed to elucidate the
relationship between optimal leverage, risk spreads, and interest rates. Section 4 concludes
with an idea of what future revisions of this paper will contain.
2 Valuation Framework
In this section, we extend the Leland and Toft (1996) model to incorporate a stochastic
interest rate and arbitrary debt structures. We then use this framework to analyze the capital
structure decision of the ﬁrm. Our basic assumptions parallel those of Merton (1974), Black
and Cox (1976), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), and Leland and Toft (1996); we outline our
assumptions below.
Assumption 1: Let V denote the value of a ﬁrm’s unleveraged assets. We assume that
V evolves according to:
dV =( µ(V,t) − α)Vd t+ σVVd W V, (1)
where µ(V,t) is the expected rate of return on the ﬁrm’s assets, α is the fraction of the ﬁrm
paid out to security holders, and dWV is a standard Wiener process.
This assumption is identical to that in Leland and Toft (1996), and diﬀers from that
in Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) only by the inclusion of α, which explicitly parameterizes
the payout policy of the ﬁrm. As in previous studies, we do not allow α to vary with the
decisions of the ﬁrm, thus abstracting away from broader issues associated with how the
investment decisions of the ﬁrm might change with capital structure. The implications of
3the ﬁrm’s investment policy for its value are proxied by the term µ(V,t) − α.
Assumption 2: Let r denote the short-term riskless (default-free) interest rate. We
assume that r evolves according to:
dr = γ(θ − r)dt + σr
√
rdWr, (2)
where γ is the rate of mean-reversion to θ, the long-term average interest rate, σr is the
volatility of the risk-free rate, and dWr is a standard Wiener process. The instantaneous
correlation between dWV and dWr is ρdt. The price of interest-rate risk is given by λ.
This assumption about the term structure dynamics is drawn from Cox et al. (1985). This
process diﬀers in important respects from that employed in Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995).
Negative interest rates are ruled out, and the volatility of interest rates is proportional to
the level of interest rates. Moreover, we will explicitly consider the price of interest rate risk;
incorporating a stochastic interest rate process but then setting the price of interest rate risk
to zero understates the importance of the interest rate factor in all respects.
We estimate the coeﬃcients of equation (2) using the methodology of Pearson and Sun
(1989) and 3-month and 10-year constant-maturity Treasury rates for the period 1965-2003.
The estimation results are displayed in Table 1. As can be seen, the data are consistent with
weak mean-reversion to a long-term average short rate of approximately 5.7 percent. Short
rate volatility is about six percent per annum, and λ = −7.6, indicating a positive term
premium.
Assumption 3: Following Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995),
we assume that the ﬁrm defaults on its obligations when V ≤ VB,w h e r eVB is a constant
lower threshold. We assume that VB = P, the face value of the ﬁrm’s debt.
In this version of the paper, we hold the bankruptcy boundary ﬁxed purely for technical
convenience. As shown in Leland and Toft (1996), the bankruptcy-triggering value VB can be
endogenized by invoking a smooth-pasting condition. In their single-factor model (interest
4rates ﬁxed), VB is found by solving the equation:
∂E(V ;VB,T)
∂V
=0a tV = VB, (3)
where T is the maturity of the debt. In future revisions of the paper, we plan to implement
an analagous condition for our model.
Assumption 4: The corporate tax rate is τ and the interest paid on debt is tax deductible.
Assumption 5: Following Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Leland and Toft (1996),
if the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy, debt-holders receive 1 − w times the face value of the debt,
and equity holders receive nothing.
As is well known in the ﬁnance literature, in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs
the value of a ﬁrm is independent of the capital structure of the ﬁrm (Modigliani and Miller
(1958)). In our model the key element driving the capital structure decision the tradeoﬀ
between the value of the tax shield oﬀered by debt and the potential costs of bankruptcy.
Like Leland and Toft (1996), we assume that the tax shield is lost when ﬁrm value falls to
the point Vτ such that αVτ <C , that is, the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is insuﬃcient to pay the coupon
in its debt.
Assumption 6: We assume there are no arbitrage opportunities and that securities trade
in continuous time.
Under these assumptions, we invoke the usual arguments to derive the partial diﬀerential
equation that deﬁnes the price F(V,r,t;T) of any security with maturity T and payoﬀs










rrFrr +( r − α)VF V +( γ(θ − r) − λr)Fr − rF + c = Ft, (4)
where c ≥ 0 is the cash ﬂow, if any, paid by the security, and subscripts on F denote
partial derivatives. The value of any derivative security is found by solving (4) subject to
appropriate boundary conditions.
5We are principally concerned with the valuation of two linked cash ﬂows: the payments
on the ﬁrm’s defaultable debt securities and the value of the tax shield provided by the
interest paid on these debt securities. We treat the tax shield as a security with cash ﬂows
contingent on the ﬁrm not defaulting on its debt; hence the values of the debt and tax shield
are linked and must be solved for simultaneously.
The ﬁrm is assumed to issue standard straight coupon debt promising to pay a coupon C
each period and to return the principal P at maturity. In contrast to Leland and Toft (1996),
we do not consider a stationary debt structure where the ﬁrm makes a constant payment
of principal and interest each period. Rather, we consider the more realistic case where
ﬁrms issue debt in discrete tranches. This has a number of implications for the analysis.
First, the placement of the principal payment in time has a signiﬁcant impact on the risk of
bankrupty and hence the expected present value of bankruptcy costs. In general, a ﬁrm is
always better oﬀ to push the principal payment far into the future. Second, the consideration
of multiple tranches of debt requires the simultaneous solution of the valuation equation for
each tranche of debt. However, the case of multiple debt tranches will allow us to analyze
how ﬁrms dynamically adjust their capital structure. We will consider this issue in future
revisions of the paper.
The value of the ﬁrm’s debt, D(V,r,t;VB,T) is the solution to equation (4) subject to
the following boundary conditions:
D(0,r,t;VB,T)=0 ; ( 5 )
lim
r→∞D(V,r,t;VB,T) → 0; (6)
D(V,r,t;VB,T)=( 1 − w)V for V ≤ VB;( 7 )
D(V,r,T;VB,T)=P for VT >V B. (8)
Boundary condition (5) states that the debt is worthless if the value of the ﬁrm’s assets
falls to zero; under our model, zero is an absorbing boundary on ﬁrm value. Condition
6(6) captures the notion that at very high interest rates future cash ﬂows are worthless.2
Condition (7) is the bankruptcy condition, and the boundary condition (8) states that the
ﬁrm will return the principal amount P at maturity as long as its assets are worth more
than VB; otherwise, condition (7) applies.
The value of the tax shield, S(V,r,t;VB,T) is the solution to equation (4) subject to the
following boundary conditions:
S(0,r,t;VB,T)=0 ; ( 9 )
lim
r→∞S(V,r,t;VB,T) → 0; (10)
S(V,r,t;VB,T)=0 f o r V ≤ VB; (11)
S(V,r,T;VB,T)=τC for VT >V B.. (12)
Boundary conditions (9) and (10) are completely analagous to (5) and (6). Condition (11)
says that the value of the tax shield falls to zero in bankruptcy. Condition (12) captures an
important aspect of the debt structures we study: when the debt matures, the ﬁrm is not
assumed to issue more debt. Hence on the maturity date of the ﬁrm’s debt its tax shield is
only worth the tax rate on the ﬁnal coupon payment.3
Under this framework, the value of the ﬁrm, F(V,r,t;VB,T)i sg i v e nb y :
F = V + D + S, (13)
where we have dropped function arguments for brevity. The value of the ﬁrm is equal to its
unleveraged asset value, V , plus the value of its defaultable debt, D, plus the value of the
tax shield, S. Noting that the costs of bankruptcy are incorporated into the value of debt,
equation (13) is completely analagous to the standard decomposition of leveraged ﬁrm value
2Technically, there is a boundary condition for zero interest rates. Zero is an inaccessible bound for our
interest rate process; we handle this numerically by assuming that at zero interest rates, interest rates move
up by the drift rate of the interest rate process. We note that this has an undetectable eﬀect on the security
prices for realistic values of r and V .
3In future revisions of the paper we will consider the case of debt rollovers.
7into unleveraged assets, debt, tax shield, and bankruptcy costs. The equity value of the ﬁrm
is given by E = F − D.
We solve for the values of the debt and the tax shield using standard numerical techniques.
This involves discretizing the PDE and applying a ﬁnite diﬀerence algorithm; see Gourlay
and McKee (1977) and Downing, Stanton and Wallace (2005) for details.
3 Optimal Capital Structure
In this section we conduct comparative statics experiments on our model. We compute the
optimal leverage ratio (hereafter, D
V , the value of the ﬁrm’s debt divided by the unlevered as-
set value) for diﬀerent combinations of the key variables of the model.4 For each combination
of input parameters, we report the par coupon (C), leveraged ﬁrm value (F), and the risk
spread at the optimal leverage ratio. We measure the risk spread as the diﬀerence between
the par coupon and the par coupon on equal-maturity risk-free bonds.5 To facilitate these
comparisons, we consider a “base case” scenario in Table 2 with the following parameter
settings: the bankruptcy cost fraction w =0 .50, the corporate tax rate τ =0 .35, and the
ﬁrm payout ratio α =0 .07. We assume the bankruptcy trigger VB is equal to the face value
of the debt.
The initial value of the ﬁrm’s underlying assets is normalized to one (V =1a tt =0 ) ;
this is without loss of generality since the implications of the debt load only depend on the
par value of the debt relative to the value of the ﬁrm’s assets. Under the base case scenario,
the volatility of unlevered ﬁrm value σv =0 .2. As noted earlier, the interest rate process is
parameterized at the values shown in Table 1. Finally, in the base case we set the correlation
between risk-free interest rate and unlevered ﬁrm value ρ =0 .
4We will always work with par-valued debt since this eases comparisions and because ﬁrms typically
issue debt at par; hence at the time point we consider—when the debt is ﬁrst issued—there is no diﬀerence
between D and P and we use the two interchangeably when no confusion will arise.
5In future revisions of the paper we will duration-match the securities; here we use maturity because it is
simpler, but this likely matches the ﬁrm’s risky debt to a risk-free bond that is “too long” in duration terms
and hence the risk-spreads will be under-stated when the term structure is upward sloping, and vice-versa.
8Table 2 reports the optimal leverage ratio, the ﬁrm’s leveraged value at this point, and
the par coupon and risk spread on the ﬁrm’s debt. The initial risk-free interest rate, r0,i s
alternately set to three percent, six percent and 15 percent. At each level of the risk-free
rate, we report results for debt maturities, T, equal to one year, ﬁve years, 10 years and 20
years. Observe that for any given initial default-free interest rate, the leverage ratio which
maximizes the value of the ﬁrm falls as the maturity of the debt increases. This result
diﬀers from Leland and Toft (1996), where the optimal leverage ratio rises with maturity.
Under their model, the bankruptcy trigger, VB, falls as the maturity of the bond increases,
which implies lower bankruptcy risk for longer maturity debt. In contrast, we assume that
bondholders have the right to force the ﬁrm into bankruptcy when the ﬁrm’s value falls
below the face value of its debt—the bankruptcy trigger VB is constant in our model. All
else equal, as the maturity of the debt lengthens, the likelihood of ending up in default rises,
reducing the optimal debt load.
It is obvious from Table 2 that for any given maturity, a higher initial value of the risk-free
rate corresponds to higher leverage. The rate of mean-reversion in interest rates is weak, so
a higher initial risk-free rate implies a fairly long period of greater expected appreciation in
asset values and thus a higher debt capacity. We also see the reﬂection of the shape of the
term structure in the ﬁrm’s par coupon term structure. For low r0, the par coupon rises with
maturity T, since the risk-free term structure is upward-sloping. For moderate-to-high r0,
the risk-free term structure is “hump” shaped, as is the ﬁrm’s par-coupon term structure.
Finally, the risk-free and par-coupon term structures are downward sloping for very high
r0 = 15 percent, reﬂecting the assumed mean-reversion in interest rates.
Figure 1 examines risk spreads as a function of maturity, T, for ﬁrms with leverage
ratios of 40 percent (solid line), 50 percent (short dashed line), 60 percent (medium dashed
line), and 70 percent (long dashed line). We use the parameters from the base case. The
initial risk-free interest rate r0 is set to 3 percent (Panel A), 6 percent (Panel B), and 15
percent (Panel C). The panels exhibit similar patterns of risk spreads: for high or moderate
9leverage, risk spreads are high with a distinct hump shape; for ﬁrms with low leverage levels,
risk spreads are low and rise nearly monotonically with maturity. At a given leverage ratio,
risk spreads decrease as the initial risk-free rate rises. This negative correlation between
spreads and interest rates has been veriﬁed empirically by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995)
using Moody’s corporate bond yield data. We should note that the risk spreads here are
signiﬁcantly larger than those in Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Leland and Toft (1996)
for similar parameter settings, reﬂecting the fact that we are treating interest rates as a
priced risk factor.
3.1 Capital Structure and The Term Structure
We now turn to the behavior of the optimal leverage ratio as we vary the coeﬃcients of the
assumed term structure process. The correlation between the stochastic processes for ﬁrm
value and interest rates is characterized by the parameter ρ. Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995)
suggest that diﬀerences in credit spreads across industries and sectors might be related to
cross-sectional variation in the correlation of asset returns and interest rates. To examine
how such diﬀerences might explain the cross-sectional variation in capital structures and risk
spreads, we alternately set the correlation coeﬃcient ρ to -0.75, 0.00, and 0.75, and hold all
of the other parameters at their base-case values.
Table 3 reports calculations of optimal leverage ratios, ﬁrm values, par coupons, and risk
spreads for the three diﬀerent correlation settings. Holding the initial risk-free rate, r0,a n d
maturity, T, ﬁxed, changes in the correlation coeﬃcient ρ have little eﬀect on the optimal
leverage ratio. As shown in Figure 2 for the case of 20 year debt (T = 20) and an initial
risk-free interest rate of 15 percent (r = 15%), this is because changes in correlation produce
greater convexity in the relationship between ﬁrm value and leverage, but do not move
the optimal leverage point much. However, the correlation setting does aﬀect risk spreads,
particularly at longer maturities. Thinking of a ﬁrm as a portfolio long in assets and the
tax shield (and short defaultable bonds), this result says that the optimal portfolio weights
10between assets and bonds do not change much, but the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt of adding debt
is not as large when the correlation between assets and bonds is positive; hence risk spreads
are higher relative to the case where the correlation coeﬃcient is zero or negative.
The volatility of interest rates is governed by the coeﬃcient σr. Table 4 reports the
relationship between interest rate volatility and optimal leverage. We use the parameters of
the base case and alternately set σr to 0.03, 0.06 and 0.09. Table 4 shows that, holding r ﬁxed,
higher interest-rate volatility has little eﬀect on leverage or risk spreads at short maturities,
but at longer maturities risk spreads widen substantially as interest-rate volatility increases.
The optimal leverage ratio is largely unaﬀected by changes in interest-rate volatility, though
ﬁrm values do decline somewhat as σr increases.
The rate at which interest rates revert to the mean is given by the parameter γ.O u r
estimates of this parameter suggest a relatively weak rate of mean reversion, and hence the
term structure model at the estimated parameter values cannot produce steeply sloped term
structures. This may in part explain why the model is rejected, and may also indicate that
the rate of mean reversion moves through time—that is, that investors’ convictions regarding
the likelihood of rising or falling short rates may change over time, motivated, for example,
by the eﬀect of monetary policy on interest rate expectations. To better understand the
operation of our model as well as to gain some insight into how a more complicated model
with time-varying mean-reversion might behave, we consider some alternative settings of the
mean-reversion coeﬃcient.
We use the parameters of the base case and set the rate of mean reversion γ to 0.13131,
0.50 and 1.0. Table 5 reports the relationship between the optimal leverage ratio and the
rate of mean reversion γ. For any given maturity, the increase of the rate of mean reversion
has more eﬀect on the optimal leverage decision when the initial risk-free interest rate is
high, since obviously it is for these values that mean reversion is an issue. Naturally enough,
high rates of mean reversion produce a situation where the current setting of the risk-free
rate, r, has little eﬀect on capital structure. Firms expect interest rates to move quickly back
11to the mean, and hence the optimal capital structures resemble those at the mean interest
rate of r = 6 percent.
The price of interest rate risk is captured by λ, which we estimate to be equal to -0.0758.
As noted earlier, other studies have typically set λ = 0. In order to understand how that
restriction aﬀects the results, as well as to better understand how our model operates, we
consider alternative settings for λ equal to 0.0, -0.0758 and -0.16. Observe from Table 6
that, at any given initial risk-free interest rate and maturity combination, both ﬁrm value at
the optimal leverage ratio and the par coupon rise with the price of interest rate risk. The
reason we ﬁnd this result is that the price of interest rate risk does not aﬀect the probability
of bankruptcy, but it does boost longer-term interest rates and hence par coupons. Hence
the value of the tax shield is higher but the expected present value of bankruptcy costs is
unchanged, leading ﬁrms to choose higher levels of leverage. This eﬀect is most pronounced
when the initial risk-free interest rate, r, is relatively high and the issuance maturity, T,i s
greater than ﬁve years.
3.2 Capital Structure and Firm Characteristics
For completeness, we consider how capital structure is related to ﬁrm characteristics. Since
we employ the same process for ﬁrm value as Leland and Toft (1996), there are few surprises
here; the point of this brief section is to establish that, in these dimensions, our model is
consistent with previous studies.
The volatility of the ﬁrm’s underlying assets is given by σv. Table 7 reports the relation-
ship between optimal leverage ratio and ﬁrm risk σv. We use the parameters of the base case
and set the volatility of unlevered ﬁrm value to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4. Observe that the optimal
leverage ratio, as well as ﬁrm value, falls as volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets rises, as expected.
Because bankruptcy risk is cumulative over time, ﬁrms with higher asset volatilities see
less beneﬁt to long-term debt than ﬁrms with safer assets. For example, when initial risk-free
interest rate r = 3 percent, ﬁrms with the asset volatility σv =0 .4 increase their market
12value from $1.0031 with one-year debt to $1.0134 with 20-year debt, an increase of about
one percent, whereas a ﬁrm with asset volatility σv =0 .1 sees its value jump from $1.0074
with one-year debt to $1.0859 dollars with 20-year debt, an increase of about eight percent.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence of Stohs and Mauer (1996). They report that
larger, less risky ﬁrms use relatively longer-term debt than smaller, riskier ﬁrms.
In our model, we assume that the bankruptcy cost, w, is the fraction of the market value
of the ﬁrm that will be lost in bankruptcy. As noted earlier, the magnitude of bankruptcy
costs is a key determinant of the optimal leverage ratio, since the trade-oﬀ between tax
savings and bankuptcy costs is central to the capital structure decision. Moreover, it is
well known that bankruptcy costs (conversely, recovery rates) exhibit substantial variation
through time and across industries. In order to shed more light on the relationship between
the magnitude of w and the leverage ratio and risk spreads in our model, Table 8 reports the
usual set of results for w set to 0.0, 0.50, and 1.00. As expected, at any given initial risk-free
interest rate and maturity, optimal leverage falls as bankruptcy costs rise. The eﬀect of
higher bankruptcy costs is most pronounced for combinations of r and T that produce the
highest risk of bankruptcy. Hence we see substantial variation in the optimal leverage ratio
and risk spreads with w for low interest rates and long maturities.
Table 9 examines the eﬀects of varying a ﬁrm’s payout ratio, α. We set the ﬁrm payout
ratio α to 0.02, 0.07, and 0.10. At any given initial risk-free interest rate and maturity
combination, an increase in the payout ratio causes the optimal leverage ratio as well as ﬁrm
value to fall. The reason for this result is that, if ﬁrms pay out at a faster rate, their assets
grow at a slower rate—a pecking-order like result that ﬁrms will maximize their growth and
hence value by growing through retained earnings ﬁrst and then raising external capital.
134C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we made some ﬁrst steps in understanding the relationship between a ﬁrm’s
capital structure and the term structure of interest rates when we consider interest rates as
a priced risk-factor and where the ﬁrm issues a single tranche of straight debt. We found
that the level of the risk-free rate has a large impact on the ﬁrm’s optimal leverage level,
with ﬁrm’s leveraging more aggressively when interest rates are high. Firms with assets
negatively correlated with interest rates face signiﬁcantly lower risk-spreads; we oﬀered a
diversiﬁcation-like argument to support these results. In regimes marked by faster interest-
rate mean-reversion, our model predicts less cross-sectional dispersion in capital structures
due to interest rate variation: ﬁrms expect a return to the mean in short order, hence all
capital structures are “at-the-mean” capital structures. Interest rate volatility has a modest
eﬀect on capital structure and risk spreads, principally exerting an upward inﬂuence at longer
maturities.
This model has a number of shortcomings that we plan to address in future revisions of
the paper. First, the model predicts that ﬁrms will always choose the longest-maturity debt,
a shortcoming our model shares with closely related models such as Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995) and Leland and Toft (1996). The principal reason for this prediction is that, at
longer maturities both the value of the tax shield is higher (there are more payments) and
the expected present discounted value of bankruptcy costs is lower (costs are pushed further
into the future). There are at least two interesting ways to try and break this relationship.
First, we plan to consider dynamic debt policy where a ﬁrm issuing short-term debt is
assumed to roll the debt over at its maturity date. The aim is to examine how matching
the time period over which the tax shield is earned might under certain circumstances swing
optimal leverage toward short-term debt. Second, we plan to explicitly consider agency
costs. As noted in Leland and Toft (1996), agency costs could explain why some ﬁrms issue
short-term debt: short-term debt induces market-discipline on ﬁrms by forcing them to re-
contract with debtholders at a higher frequency. The challenge is to make this connection
14explicit in the model.
Another important extension that we are currently working on is to consider the case
of multiple tranches of debt. Obviously, when ﬁrms issue debt they do so in a way that is
perceived to be optimal, but then the world changes and the ﬁrms are forced into sub-optimal
capital structures. A model that can handle several tranches of debt is capable of examining
how ﬁrms dynamically adjust their capital structures as state variables change. Finally, we
plan to examine the case for callable debt under diﬀerent term structures.
15Figure 1: The Term Structure of Risk Spreads
The ﬁgure shows risk spreads, measured as the basis point diﬀerence between the par coupon on the ﬁrm’s
debt and the par coupon yield on an equal-maturity risk-free bond, as a function of issuance maturity T
(in years) for ﬁrms with leverage ratios of 40 percent (solid line), 50 percent (short dashed line), 60 percent
(medium dashed line), and 70 percent (long dashed line). Panel A displays risk spreads for an initial risk-
free rate of three percent; Panels B and C show risk spreads for initial risk-free rates of six and 15 percent,
respectively. The other parameters are held at their base case values.















































































































































16Figure 2: Firm value as a function of leverage ratios.
The lines plot levered ﬁrm value (in dollars) against leverage ratios D/V . The solid line shows how ﬁrm
value varies with leverage under the base case with a setting of ρ = −0.75, the short dashed line shows
























































17Table 1: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Interest-Rate Process Coeﬃcients
The table displays maximum-likelihood estimates of the coeﬃcients of the interest rate process
dr =( γ(θ − r) − λr)dt + σr
√
rdWr,
where γ is the rate of reversion to the long-term mean θ, λ is the price of interest-rate risk, and σr is the
volatility of interest rates. The data are daily 3-month and 10-year constant-maturity Treasury rates for the
period January 4, 1965 through December 31, 2003, for a total of 9,734 daily observations. The estimates








18Table 2: Optimal Capital Structure under the Base Case
This table computes the optimal leverage ratio (D/V ), the par coupon on the ﬁrm’s debt, and ﬁrm value
at the optimal leverage ratio, given initial risk-free interest rates r and alternative choices of maturities T
ranging from one year to 20 years. The par coupon and the initial value of risk-free interest rate r are
expressed in percent; the risk spreads, measured as the diﬀerence between the par coupon on the ﬁrm’s bond
and the par coupon yield on an equal-maturity risk-free bond, is displayed in basis points; the ﬁrm value is
expressed in dollars. The bankruptcy cost fraction w = 0.50, the corporate tax rate τ = 0.35, and the ﬁrm
payout ratio α = 0.07. The initial value of the ﬁrm’s underlying assets V0 = $1. The volatility of unlevered
ﬁrm value σv = 0.20. The rate of mean reversion in interest rate γ = 0.1313, the long-term interest rate
mean θ = 0.0574, risk-adjustment to interest rate λ = −0.0758, and the volatility of short rate σr = 0.0603.
The correlation between riskfree interest rate and unlevered ﬁrm value ρ = 0.00. It is assumed that the
bankruptcy trigger VB is equal to P, the face value of the ﬁrm’s debt.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3 1 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
5 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
10 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
20 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
6 1 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
5 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
10 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
20 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
9 1 0.6 1.0173 9.89 9.55 34
5 0.5 1.0507 10.95 9.90 105
10 0.4 1.0749 10.65 10.09 56
20 0.4 1.0964 10.90 10.19 71
12 1 0.7 1.0214 14.41 12.79 162
5 0.6 1.0719 14.04 12.81 123
10 0.6 1.1040 14.05 12.69 136
20 0.6 1.1282 13.86 12.44 142
15 1 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
5 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
10 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
20 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
19Table 3: Asset Value-Interest Rate Correlation and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value,
and Risk Spreads
This table examines the eﬀect of correlation between ﬁrm value and default-free interest rate on ﬁrm’s
leverage decision. For each setting of the intitial risk-free rate, r,a n dm a t u r i t y ,T, we compute the optimal
leverage ratio D/V , ﬁrm value, par coupon, and risk spread for three settings of ρ, the correlation between
movements in the unleveraged value of the ﬁrm’s assets and interest rates. The other parameters are as in
Table 2 above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT ρ D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 -0.75 0.5 1.0053 3.37 3.34 3
0.00 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.75 0.5 1.0052 3.42 3.34 8
5 -0.75 0.3 1.0194 4.35 4.35 0
0.00 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
0.75 0.3 1.0181 4.57 4.35 22
10 -0.75 0.3 1.0370 5.44 5.25 19
0.00 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
0.75 0.3 1.0305 6.20 5.25 95
20 -0.75 0.3 1.0596 6.41 6.23 18
0.00 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
0.75 0.3 1.0472 7.49 6.23 126
6.0 1 -0.75 0.6 1.0112 6.91 6.33 58
0.00 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.75 0.6 1.0106 7.11 6.33 78
5 -0.75 0.4 1.0371 7.38 7.08 30
0.00 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
0.75 0.4 1.0320 8.00 7.08 92
10 -0.75 0.4 1.0591 8.04 7.62 42
0.00 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
0.75 0.3 1.0485 8.29 7.62 67
20 -0.75 0.4 1.0832 8.46 8.12 34
0.00 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
0.75 0.3 1.0668 9.15 8.12 103
15.0 1 -0.75 0.7 1.0302 16.49 16.13 36
0.00 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
0.75 0.7 1.0285 17.02 16.13 89
5 -0.75 0.7 1.0967 16.58 15.82 76
0.00 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
0.75 0.6 1.0895 16.85 15.82 103
10 -0.75 0.7 1.1403 15.84 15.41 43
0.00 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
0.75 0.6 1.1247 16.81 15.41 140
20 -0.75 0.7 1.1723 15.15 14.87 28
0.00 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
0.75 0.6 1.1463 16.59 14.87 172
20Table 4: Interest Rate Volatility and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value, and Risk
Spreads
This table examines the optimal leverage ratio under diﬀerent settings of the level of interest rate volatility
σr for given initial risk-free interest rates, r, and maturities, T. The other parameters are as in Table 2.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT σ r D/V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.03 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.06 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.09 0.5 1.0052 3.39 3.34 5
5 0.03 0.3 1.0190 4.48 4.38 10
0.06 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
0.09 0.3 1.0185 4.43 4.29 14
10 0.03 0.3 1.0345 5.87 5.36 51
0.06 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
0.09 0.3 1.0311 5.77 5.08 69
20 0.03 0.3 1.0557 7.05 6.51 54
0.06 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
0.09 0.3 1.0456 6.86 5.84 102
6.0 1 0.03 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.06 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.09 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
5 0.03 0.4 1.0349 7.71 7.13 58
0.06 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
0.09 0.4 1.0334 7.66 6.98 68
10 0.03 0.4 1.0545 8.68 7.79 89
0.06 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
0.09 0.3 1.0486 7.82 7.35 47
20 0.03 0.4 1.0775 9.31 8.51 80
0.06 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
0.09 0.3 1.0653 8.41 7.59 82
15.0 1 0.03 0.7 1.0294 16.75 16.14 61
0.06 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
0.09 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.14 62
5 0.03 0.6 1.0957 16.26 15.95 31
0.06 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
0.09 0.6 1.0918 16.22 15.61 61
10 0.03 0.6 1.1366 16.07 15.76 31
0.06 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
0.09 0.6 1.1253 15.87 14.88 99
20 0.03 0.6 1.1650 15.80 15.54 26
0.06 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
0.09 0.6 1.1453 15.33 13.91 142
21Table 5: The Rate of Mean Reversion of Interest Rates and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm
Value, and Risk Spreads
This table reports the relationship between optimal leverage ratio and rate of mean reversion γ for diﬀerent
initial risk-free interest rates and debt maturities. The other parameters are as in Table 2 above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT γ D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.1 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.5 0.5 1.0059 3.80 3.71 9
1.0 0.5 1.0067 4.22 4.12 10
5 0.1 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
0.5 0.3 1.0229 5.29 5.25 4
1.0 0.3 1.0244 5.62 5.61 1
10 0.1 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
0.5 0.3 1.0390 6.29 5.88 41
1.0 0.3 1.0394 6.34 5.94 40
20 0.1 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
0.5 0.3 1.0539 6.92 6.23 69
1.0 0.3 1.0525 6.84 6.10 74
6.0 1 0.1 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.5 0.6 1.0107 6.93 6.33 60
1.0 0.6 1.0105 6.85 6.33 52
5 0.1 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
0.5 0.4 1.0312 7.24 6.62 62
1.0 0.4 1.0294 6.99 6.35 64
10 0.1 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
0.5 0.3 1.0450 7.12 6.73 39
1.0 0.3 1.0424 6.79 6.37 42
20 0.1 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
0.5 0.3 1.0601 7.48 6.80 68
1.0 0.3 1.0555 7.15 6.38 77
15.0 1 0.1 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
0.5 0.7 1.0255 15.51 14.42 109
1.0 0.6 1.0227 12.82 12.69 13
5 0.1 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
0.5 0.5 1.0578 11.91 10.98 93
1.0 0.4 1.0420 9.30 8.65 65
10 0.1 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
0.5 0.5 1.0693 11.15 9.53 162
1.0 0.4 1.0525 9.00 7.71 129
20 0.1 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
0.5 0.4 1.0812 9.92 8.69 123
1.0 0.3 1.0630 8.21 7.25 96
22Table 6: The Price of Interest Rate Risk and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value, and
Risk Spreads
This table reports the relationship between the ﬁrm’s optimal leverage ratio and the price of interest rate
risk, λ, for diﬀerent initial risk-free interest rates and debt maturities. The other parameters are as in Table 2
above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT λ D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.0000 0.5 1.0050 3.28 3.22 6
-0.0758 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 5
-0.1600 0.5 1.0054 3.53 3.48 5
5 0.0000 0.3 1.0160 3.92 3.75 17
-0.0758 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
-0.1600 0.3 1.0225 5.21 5.18 3
10 0.0000 0.3 1.0232 4.98 4.15 84
-0.0758 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
-0.1600 0.3 1.0470 7.25 7.01 24
20 0.0000 0.3 1.0286 5.84 4.52 131
-0.0758 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
-0.1600 0.3 1.0781 9.14 9.07 7
6.0 1 0.0000 0.6 1.0104 6.80 6.16 64
-0.0758 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.40 61
-0.1600 0.6 1.0115 7.26 6.68 58
5 0.0000 0.4 1.0277 6.85 6.06 79
-0.0758 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
-0.1600 0.4 1.0428 8.88 8.50 38
10 0.0000 0.3 1.0392 6.56 5.94 62
-0.0758 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
-0.1600 0.4 1.0765 10.70 10.28 42
20 0.0000 0.3 1.0483 6.91 5.79 112
-0.0758 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 51
-0.1600 0.4 1.1075 12.08 11.94 15
15.0 1 0.0000 0.7 1.0279 16.30 15.50 80
-0.0758 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
-0.1600 0.7 1.0310 17.30 16.87 43
5 0.0000 0.6 1.0777 14.58 13.47 111
-0.0758 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
-0.1600 0.7 1.1137 19.66 19.06 60
10 0.0000 0.6 1.0985 13.60 11.90 170
-0.0758 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
-0.1600 0.8 1.1328 22.61 20.64 197
20 0.0000 0.6 1.1097 12.65 10.34 232
-0.0758 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
-0.1600 0.8 1.1548 22.95 21.45 150
23Table 7: Asset Volatility and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value, and Risk Spreads
This table computes the optimal leverage ratio, ﬁrm value, par coupon, and risk spread for diﬀerent levels
of asset volatility, σv. The other parameters are as in Table 2 above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rTσ v D/V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.1 0.7 1.0074 3.38 3.34 4
0.2 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.4 0.3 1.0031 3.48 3.34 14
5 0.1 0.5 1.0303 4.48 4.35 13
0.2 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
0.4 0.1 1.0059 4.61 4.35 26
10 0.1 0.4 1.0532 5.34 5.25 9
0.2 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
0.4 0.1 1.0094 6.19 5.25 94
20 0.1 0.4 1.0859 6.51 6.23 28
0.2 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
0.4 0.1 1.0134 7.37 6.23 114
6.0 1 0.1 0.7 1.0149 6.47 6.33 14
0.2 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.4 0.3 1.0062 6.60 6.33 27
5 0.1 0.6 1.0575 7.36 7.08 28
0.2 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
0.4 0.2 1.0120 8.55 7.08 147
10 0.1 0.6 1.0931 8.25 7.62 63
0.2 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
0.4 0.1 1.0153 8.36 7.62 74
20 0.1 0.6 1.1313 8.88 8.12 76
0.2 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
0.4 0.1 1.0200 9.13 8.12 101
15.0 1 0.1 0.9 1.0308 18.01 16.13 188
0.2 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
0.4 0.4 1.0170 16.56 16.13 43
5 0.1 0.9 1.1233 16.97 15.82 115
0.2 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
0.4 0.3 1.0441 16.86 15.82 104
10 0.1 0.9 1.1837 16.32 15.41 91
0.2 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
0.4 0.3 1.0580 16.89 15.41 148
20 0.1 0.9 1.2247 15.76 14.87 89
0.2 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
0.4 0.3 1.0658 16.64 14.87 177
24Table 8: Bankruptcy Costs and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value, and Risk Spreads
This table computes the optimal leverage ratio for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs, w. The other param-
eters are set as in Table 2 above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT w D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.0 0.7 1.0086 3.66 3.34 32
0.5 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
1.0 0.5 1.0048 3.51 3.34 17
5 0.0 0.7 1.0385 4.89 4.35 54
0.5 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
1.0 0.3 1.0173 4.63 4.35 28
10 0.0 0.7 1.0585 5.47 5.25 22
0.5 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
1.0 0.3 1.0242 6.43 5.25 118
20 0.0 0.9 1.0367 6.25 6.23 2
0.5 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
1.0 0.2 1.0342 7.01 6.23 78
6.0 1 0.0 0.8 1.0183 7.48 6.33 115
0.5 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
1.0 0.5 1.0103 6.58 6.33 25
5 0.0 0.7 1.0608 7.61 7.08 53
0.5 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
1.0 0.3 1.0297 7.24 7.08 16
10 0.0 0.7 1.0893 8.02 7.62 40
0.5 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
1.0 0.3 1.0467 8.27 7.62 65
20 0.0 0.6 1.1141 8.20 8.12 8
0.5 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
1.0 0.3 1.0625 9.12 8.12 100
15.0 1 0.0 0.9 1.0366 17.09 16.13 96
0.5 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
1.0 0.7 1.0247 17.87 16.13 174
5 0.0 0.9 1.0946 16.21 15.82 39
0.5 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
1.0 0.6 1.0822 17.15 15.82 133
10 0.0 0.8 1.1617 15.49 15.41 8
0.5 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
1.0 0.6 1.1145 16.90 15.41 149
20 0.0 0.7 1.1920 14.89 14.87 2
0.5 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
1.0 0.6 1.1363 16.48 14.87 161
25Table 9: The Firm’s Payout Policy and Optimal Capital Structure, Firm Value, and Risk
Spreads
This table computes the optimal leverage ratio for diﬀerent ﬁrm payout rates, α. The other parameters are
set as in Table 2 above.
Firm Par Risk-free Risk
rT α D /V Value Coupon Par Coupon Spread
3.0 1 0.02 0.6 1.0052 3.73 3.34 39
0.07 0.5 1.0052 3.40 3.34 6
0.10 0.5 1.0050 3.46 3.34 12
5 0.02 0.4 1.0223 4.64 4.35 29
0.07 0.3 1.0188 4.46 4.35 11
0.10 0.3 1.0172 4.67 4.35 32
10 0.02 0.4 1.0428 5.75 5.25 50
0.07 0.3 1.0332 5.83 5.25 58
0.10 0.3 1.0245 6.46 5.25 121
20 0.02 0.4 1.0756 6.66 6.23 43
0.07 0.3 1.0514 6.98 6.23 75
0.10 0.3 1.0331 7.68 6.23 145
6.0 1 0.02 0.6 1.0119 6.73 6.33 40
0.07 0.6 1.0109 7.01 6.33 68
0.10 0.5 1.0104 6.55 6.33 22
5 0.02 0.5 1.0407 7.80 7.08 72
0.07 0.4 1.0343 7.69 7.08 61
0.10 0.3 1.0296 7.28 7.08 20
10 0.02 0.5 1.0697 8.40 7.62 78
0.07 0.4 1.0518 8.66 7.62 104
0.10 0.3 1.0458 8.37 7.62 75
20 0.02 0.5 1.1050 8.80 8.12 68
0.07 0.3 1.0716 8.64 8.12 52
0.10 0.3 1.0592 9.20 8.12 108
15.0 1 0.02 0.7 1.0315 16.19 16.13 6
0.07 0.7 1.0293 16.76 16.13 63
0.10 0.7 1.0275 17.25 16.13 112
5 0.02 0.7 1.1088 16.29 15.82 47
0.07 0.6 1.0941 16.25 15.82 43
0.10 0.6 1.0849 16.90 15.82 108
10 0.02 0.7 1.1584 15.78 15.41 37
0.07 0.6 1.1321 15.98 15.41 57
0.10 0.6 1.1151 16.77 15.41 136
20 0.02 0.7 1.1933 15.21 14.87 34
0.07 0.6 1.1569 15.59 14.87 72
0.10 0.6 1.1331 16.48 14.87 161
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